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Abstract— There is an increasing demand for P2P streaming in 
particular for layered video. In this category of applications, the 
stream is composed of hierarchically encoded sub-streams layers 
namely the base layer and enhancements layers. We consider a 
scenario where the receiver peer uses the pull-based approach to 
adjust the video quality level to their capability by subscribing to 
different number of layers. We note that higher layers received 
without their corresponding lower layers are considered as 
useless and cannot be played, consequently the throughput of the 
system will drastically degrade. To avoid this situation, we 
propose an economical model based on auction mechanisms to 
optimize the allocation of sender peers’ upload bandwidth. The 
upstream peers organize auctions to “sell” theirs items (links’ 
bandwidth) according to bids submitted by the downstream 
peers taking into consideration the peers priorities and the 
requested layers importance. The ultimate goal is to satisfy the 
quality level requirement for each peer, while reducing the 
overall streaming cost. Through theoretical study and 
performance evaluation we show the effectiveness of our model in 
terms of users and network’s utility. 
Keywords- P2P; Layered video, bandwidth allocation; QoS  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are getting increasingly popular 
for streaming video over the Internet. Due to peer dynamics, 
single-layer stream can neither match the overlay capacity 
changing, nor meet heterogeneous peer requirements. Layered 
streaming, such as Scalable Video Coding (SVC), provides a 
convenient way to perform video quality adaptation to adjust 
to the changing network conditions and receiver preferences. 
A layered streaming consists of a base layer and multiple 
enhancement layers. Receivers can adjust the video quality 
level to their capability by subscribing to different number of 
layers using pulling distribution approach. In a P2P network, it 
is natural to request the layer from different peers (upstream 
peers). Thus, each upstream peer shares its upload bandwidth 
among different peers to serve different layers. How to resolve 
bandwidth conflicts among peers in order to maximize 
benefits of both upstream and downstream peers while 
respecting the layers importance, their dependencies and the 
peers’ priorities is highly challenging in P2P networks.  
For P2P streaming applications, bandwidth allocation is an 
important factor because of its direct bearing on high quality 
and lower latency performance. Kumar et al. [1] build a fluid 
model to study the impact of peers’ upload bandwidth and 
conclude conditions for universal streaming for churnless 
systems.  Zhang et al. [2] study the bandwidth influence on 
chunk (data block) scheduling algorithms using extensive 
packet-based simulations. They prove that random chunk 
scheduling can achieve near-optimal streaming quality if the 
overall upload bandwidth is at least 1.2 times of needed 
bandwidth. Furthermore, measurement studies and 
implementations [3] [4] show also that bandwidth has a big 
impact on streaming quality for P2P streaming systems. 
Recently, researchers have studied the bandwidth allocation 
for improving streaming quality in more challenging P2P 
networks such as multi-overlay, multi-sources and multi-
Swarm P2P streaming systems. Wu et al. [5] study the 
bandwidth contest among coexisting overlays and propose a 
solution based on auction. Liang and Liu [6] study the optimal 
bandwidth sharing in multiple video conferencing swarms 
systems. They dynamically share a pool of helpers between 
swarms to address the bandwidth shortage intra and inter-
swarms.  However, none of these works have taken into 
consideration the layered streaming properties, mostly the 
layers dependency.  
Many recent works, such as [7] [8], leverage the 
characteristics of SVC and P2P networks and propose 
adaptive video streaming mechanisms. In [7], authors propose 
an optimization technique based on harmony search algorithm 
in order to increase the delivery ratio for the most important 
layers, while reducing the overhead and ensuring load 
balancing in the overlay. Authors in [8] propose taxation 
based P2P layered streaming designs, including layer 
subscription policy, chunk scheduling strategy and mesh 
topology adaptation. No one of these works has tackled the 
upstream peer bandwidth allocation problem in layered P2P 
systems. Indeed, a little literature has studied bandwidth 
conflicts for layered streaming. To our knowledge, the most 
closely related work is presented by Wu et al [5]. They 
coordinate multiple streams as an auction game, where each 
peer participates in media distribution by bidding for and 
selling bandwidth. Their strategy is not compatible with 
scalable streams as each stream is considered as an isolated 
stream without any relationship with any other streams. In 
contrast, there exists inherent content priority among layers. 
Moreover, authors only consider a scenario where the upload 
bandwidth sum in the network is always sufficient to support 
all the peers’ requirement in all the overlays.  
In this paper, we look for resolving bandwidth conflicts in P2P 
layered streaming. Our main contributions are as follows: 
Firstly, we model the bandwidth allocation process in P2P 
layered streaming as a series of auction games [9] in which 
peers bid for and sell the upload bandwidth to maximize their 
benefits. In order to resolve the problem of layers dependency, 
we set up auction game to allocate bandwidth for each layer. 
We start by allocating the bandwidth for the lower layers then 
for the upper’s ones. It is important to note that in our model 
we take into consideration the requirements of peers in terms 
of video quality level as well as their priorities (QoS level of 
the peer) using a system of budget allocation for peers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we 
describe in detail the proposed auction mechanism for 
bandwidth allocation and the related theoretical study. In 
Section III, we present some illustrative simulation results. 
Finally, section IV provides the conclusion and future work. 
II. THE PROPOSED ALLOCATION MECHANISM 
In this section, we develop the proposed mechanism for 
bandwidth allocation problem in P2P layered streaming using 
microeconomic theory, namely the auction mechanism. 
1. Network model and assumptions 
We consider an overlay network composed of n peers. 
Among them m upstream peers sharing their upload 
bandwidth to serve l downstream peers, relayed by a set of 
application-layer links mi,j (link between downstream peer i 
and its upstream peer j). So, the topology of the overlay can be 
modeled as a directed weighted graph G= (S, L, K) where S 
denotes the set of upstream peers (called in some architecture 
Seeders), L the set of downstream peers (called in some 
architecture Leechers) and K the set of links. 
 
Suppose the layered stream is encoded into M layers at the 
source peer {l0, l1… lM}, with l0 representing the base layer 
and l1… lM representing the enhancement layers, respectively. 
We assume that each video layer li is distributed with a 
transmission rate of Bi. Thus, each peer can subscribe to a 
particular video layer depending on its download capacity and 
other parameters such as its processing capability, preferences, 
etc. In this paper, we assume that the peers decide their quality 
level only depending on their available download bandwidth. 
Besides, we assume that the quality level does not vary 
frequently, by applying a certain smoothing function as 
described in [10].  
To represent a practical network setting, we limit the upload 
and download capacity of any peer ∊ G by ui and bi. 
Therefore, each peer can only provide limited service for its 
downstream peers, and make a limited layer subscription as 
well. We assume also that the downstream peers have 
different levels of priorities P={pr1, pr2, …, prq} where   pr1 > 
pr2 >… >prq. So, for each downstream peer i∈L is assigned a 
level of priority pri∈P. This can be mapped in real world P2P 
systems to an incentive mechanism where peers contributing 
in the overlay (sharing more upload bandwidth for example) 
are promoted to upper priority classes, and peers less 
contributing are demoted to lower priority classes.  
2. Bandwidth allocation model 
The process of bandwidth allocation is modeled as a set of 
dynamic auction organized by upstream peers in order to give 
rise to competition on its upload bandwidth uj. The players in 
this auction game are the downstream peers. Indeed, each 
downstream peer, having an initial budget Ti, submits bids to 
all its downstream peers in order to purchase bandwidth. 
Consequently, each downstream peer can participate in 
different independent parallel auction games Aj, organized by 
its upstream peers.  
In order to guarantee a minimum quality level for all 
downstream peers, and respect the layers dependency, every 
upstream starts by allocating bandwidth for the base layer, 
than for the enhancement layers in an ascending manner. 
Concretely, every upstream peer organizes an auction to 
distribute bandwidth needed for the base layer. Then, if there 
is still remaining bandwidth, it organizes another auction to 
sell bandwidth for the first enhancement layer, the second 
enhancement layer, and so on. In the receivers’ side, the peers 
participate in auctions depending on the quality level that they 
decide. A peer which has decided a quality level 2 will 
participate in all auctions organized by its upstream peers to 
distribute bandwidth for base layer (l0), for the first 
enhancement layer (l1) and for the second enhancement layer 
(l2). We note that an upstream peer doesn’t start to allocate 
bandwidth for an upper layer, until there is no request for the 
current layer from their downstream peers (i.e. the 
downstream peers’ requests are satisfied or their budget is 
exhausted). 
A set of auction games, to distribute bandwidth for certain 
layer, is illustrated in Figure 1. In this figure, three parallel 
auctions are organized by upstream peers S1, S2 and S3 in 
order to allocate their upload bandwidths u1, u2 and u3 
respectively for certain layer lk. The downstream peer L1, 
connected to upstream peers S1, S2 and S3, participates in 
auctions A1, A2 and A3 organized by the three upstream peers. 
While the downstream peer L4 participates only in auction A3 
organized by S3 (since L4 is connected only to S3).  
Let ,	 be the bandwidth requested by the downstream peer 
i to its upstream peer j to acquire bandwidth for layer k and 
, 	be the unit price that the downstream peer is willing to pay 
for that bandwidth. The bid of the downstream peer i can be 
expressed by the pair 	, = (, , , )  
  After modeling the bandwidth allocation problem in P2P 
layered streaming as a set of auction games, where items to 
sell are the upload bandwidth, and where the sellers are the 
upstream peers and the buyers are the downstream peers, we 
discuss the allocation strategies of the upstream peers and the 
bidding strategies followed by the downstream peers. 
A. Upstrem peer’s side : bandwidth allocation strategy 
As mentioned before, the upstream peer starts allocating 
bandwidth foremost for the lowers layers then the upper 
layers. It executes the algorithm presented in Table 1. 
 =  
While   > 0		 ≤   
Auction () 
 =  −  
 =  
End while 
 
Table 1: Allocation strategy Figure 1: Auctions example 
Where   represents the total bandwidth allocated to the 
layer k for all peer i’ downstream peers and   is the 
maximum layer available in the peer i. 
In the following, we detail the strategy of the upstream peer 
within the auction game to allocate bandwidth for a layer k.  
In auction	, organized by the peer j to allocate bandwidth 
for the layer k, the seller j aims to maximize its revenue by 
selling its bandwidth at the best price. Given the downstream 
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peers’ bids 	, = (, , , ) , the upstream peer j aims to 
maximize: 
 ! ∑ (,∈$% , )                           (1) 
Subject to:     ∑ , ≤ ∈$%                                                   (2) 
Where Lj denotes the set of downstream peers connected to the 
upstream peer j.  
In order to maximize its revenue, the upstream peer adopts 
the best offer auction strategy: it starts first by serving the 
downstream peer, willing to pay the highest price. Once it is 
served and if there is still remaining bandwidth, the 
downstream peer proposing the second highest price will be 
served and so on.  
The allocation strategy of the bandwidth for a layer k is 
performed in many rounds as shown in Table 2. 
1) Receive bids from downstream peers 
2) Allocate bandwidth to downstream peer willing to pay 
the highest price 
3) While there is still remaining bandwidth serve the 
downstream peer willing to pay the next highest price 
4) Notify the allocated bandwidth to all the downstream 
peers involved in the auction 
5) Notify the allocated bandwidth to all downstream 
peers involved in the auction 
6) Receive new bids from downstream peers (having 
sufficient budget) whose bandwidth request is not 
satisfied. Go to 2  
Table 2: Bandwidth allocation strategy 
B. Downstream side: bidding strategy 
As presented earlier, the bidding of a downstream peer i in 
auction organized by an upstream peer j to sell bandwidth for 
layer k is the pair 	, = (, , , ). The question to deal with 
here is what strategy should be followed by the downstream 
peer to set ,  and	, 	? In other words how much bandwidth   
downstream peer requests to each of its upstream peer and at 
what price?  
The ultimate goal of the downstream peer is to minimize 
the bidding cost as well as the streaming cost. The bidding 
cost can be mapped in real world’s auction to the items’ 
purchase price which express the competition degree on these 
items. Indeed, we believe that requesting stream from less 
loaded upstream peers, allows reducing the delay, since it 
reduces the congestion in the concerned peers. In addition it 
allows a good load balancing of the stream through the 
overlay, which can be benefic in the case of peers churn. The 
streaming cost can be seen as the transport cost of purchased 
items. In the context of P2P streaming, reducing the streaming 
cost is equivalent to get the stream from best links. That 
means links with lowest delay, lowest bit error rate, etc. So, 
the goal of the downstream peer is to get bandwidth from less 
loaded upstream peers (low price) and via best links (low 
streaming cost).  
As introduced before, the downstream peer starts first by 
requesting bandwidth for the lower layers, the enhancement 
layers incrementally, by joining the corresponding auction 
organized by the upstream peers in this order. This strategy 
allows requesting primarily the bandwidth for the lower layers 
from the best links and then the enhancement layers from the 
other links. Hence, lower layers have more chance to be 
received by the downstream peers, and consequently more 
chance to decode the layered stream properly. In the opposite, 
if the upper layers are promoted, the decoding of the stream 
could not be possible in the case of the corresponding lower 
layers are missing and by consequence, the throughput of the 
system will degrade. 
Formally, in each auction games organized by an upstream 
peer j to allocate bandwidth for the layer k, the downstream 
peer aims to minimize the bidding cost. That means: 
min∑ , ,∈)* 	   Subject to   ∑ , ≥ 	∈)*                (3, 4) 
Where Si denotes the set of upstream peers of the peer i and 	 
denotes the transmission rate of layer k. 
In addition to the bidding cost, the downstream peer aims 
also to minimize the streaming cost from each of its upstream 
peer j, denoted as	,,(, ). Therefore, the bidding strategy of 
downstream peer i, in each auction game   to acquire 
bandwidth for layer k, can be seen as an optimization problem 
of the overall cost: 
min∑ (, , +∈)* ,,(, ))           (5) 
Subject to               ∑ , ≥ 	∈)*  and , ≥ 0               (6, 7) 
In practice, we consider the streaming cost function ,, 	as 
non-decreasing function depending on	, , strictly convex and 
twice derivable. 
In the following we present the bidding strategy of the 
peer to set the requested bandwidth (, ) and the bidding unit 
price (, ). 
a) Peer’s strategy to set the requested bandwidth (, ) 
Given the bid price   in an auction organized by the 
upstream peer j to allocate bandwidth for layer k, the 
downstream peer i aims to optimize the overall cost by 
adjusting the requested bandwidth ,  from each downstream 
peer. So, the goal of the downstream peer is to minimize the 
global marginal cost Mi defined as the change in total cost that 
arises when the quantity produced changes by one unit [11].  
Let ci be the overall cost at the downstream peer i, i.e. 
. = ∑ (, , +∈)* ,,(, ))                            (8) 
The corresponding marginal cost is: 
/ = 01*02*,%3 = ∑
, + ∑
04*,%52*,%3 6
02*,%3∈)*	
∈)*                            (9) 
Since the streaming cost function Ei,j is strictly convex, the 
second derivative *7,89
= 
′′,7,857,89 6
7,89
 is strictly positive. 
Consequently, the marginal cost Mi increases with the increase 
of the bandwidth request 	, . To solve efficiently this 
optimization problem we consider the water filling algorithm 
[12]. To set the bandwidth quantity (to request from an 
upstream peer j), the downstream peer i - applying the water 
filling algorithm - set 	, 	to 0 for all	8 ∈ ;, then it identifies 
the upstream peer j0 having the lowest marginal cost Mi,j0  and 
increases its demand 	,< until the marginal cost becomes 
equal to the next highest marginal cost Mi,j1, corresponding to 
the upstream peer jl. The downstream peer i increases then 
fairly 	,<  and 	,= until their corresponding marginal cost 
Mi,j0 and Mi,j1 meet the next highest marginal cost Mi,j2 
corresponding to the upstream peer j2, and so on. The 
downstream peer carries out this mechanism with all its 
upstream peers until it obtains the bandwidth that it requests 
for the layer k (	). 
b) Peer’s Downstream peer’s strategy to set the bidding unit 
price (>, ) 
After defining the bandwidth request strategy of the 
downstream peer, the next question to deal with is how the 
downstream peer set the unit price that it will announce to the 
upstream peer j?  
In the bootstrap stage of each auction, the downstream peer is 
provided with an initial budget  ? for each layer k, which it 
spends to acquire bandwidth for the layer k. This budget is 
relative to the priority of the peer. The peer with higher 
priority receives larger budget, and vice versa. The budget  ? 
of the downstream peer i is defined by the formula:  
? = @	                                    (10) 
Where @  denotes the reference unit price assigned to the 
downstream peer i. 
When the downstream peer i joins the auction organized by a 
upstream peer j, first, it sets its price bid to one unit (i.e.	, =
1 ). Using the water filling algorithm described earlier, it 
computes the optimal quantity of bandwidth ,  to request 
from each upstream peer j, and submits bids consequently. 
After the upstream peers allocate their upload bandwidth using 
the strategy described above, it proposes the bandwidth ,  to 
the corresponding downstream peers. On receiving the 
proposed bandwidth, the downstream peer determines its 
behavior in the next round of auctions, using the following 
algorithm:  
1) Receive bandwidth allocation and current prices from 
upstream peer. 
2) For each upstream peer: 
If requested bandwidth , 	from an upstream peer j is 
not satisfied:  
a. Increase the price ,  by one unite within the 
reference price  @ 
b. Using the water filling algorithm, decide the 
quantity of bandwidth , to request from j  
3) Send new bids (, , , ) to the upstream peer 
Table 3: Bidding algorithm 
It is clear in this algorithm that the reference price		@ 	assigned 
to the downstream peer allows differentiating the downstream 
peers in accordance with their priorities. 
C. Convergence to Nash equilibrium 
Our mechanism for bandwidth allocation can be modeled 
as a non-cooperative game where the players are the set of 
downstream peers L, the strategies are the set of bids (, , , ) 
and the cost function of a player i is the overall streaming and 
bidding cost Ci. Formally, we consider the finite game  Γ  = < 
L, D, C>  where:   
- L denotes the set of players (downstream peers) 
- D denotes the set of strategies, i.e.  D = (D1, D2 … 
Di), where Di = (	, ,		,B …	, ) is the tuple of bids 
submitted by the player to its upstream peers.  
- C denotes the set of costs: C = (c1, c2 … ci), where ci 
is the overall cost at the player i as defined in (8). 
Theorem  
The auction game for bandwidth allocation in layered P2P 
leads to a Nash equilibrium 
Proof 
Due to lack of space, details of the proof are omitted. The 
basic idea behind is to prove the Nash equilibrium of each 
auction	, and then derive the Nash equilibrium of the whole 
system. The proof of the Nash equilibrium in   can be 
reduced to the proof of the existence of fixed point for the 
transfer function describing the evolution of the auction states 
from an auction round to another. After that we can conclude 
that our system presents a Nash equilibrium point, which is the 
set of Nash equilibrium points of all the auctions	. 
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section we describe the performance evaluation of the 
proposed bandwidth allocation mechanism for different QoS 
levels using Simulink-Matlab simulations [14]. 
A. Simulation set up 
The performance of our system is carried for mesh based 
P2P network of different size to measure the performance of 
our mechanism in terms of: 
- The delivery ratio of each layer 
- Useless chunks ratio defined as the ratio of number of 
chunks received without their corresponding lower layers 
- Downstream peers’ average streaming cost 
- The efficiency of peers priority distribution over the 
network 
We generate diverse topologies of different sizes and different 
upstream peers’ connectivity degree, defined as the number of 
downstream peers connected to the same upstream peer. Each 
network includes three classes of downstream peers: Q1, Q2 
and Q3 with priorities pr1, pr2 and pr3 respectively.  
The upload bandwidth of each upstream peer varies from 256 
kbps to 2 Mbps and it is uniformly distributed throughout the 
network, while the download bandwidth of each downstream 
peer varies between 256 kbps and 1 Mbps. 
The stream is subdivided to 6 layers. The bitrate of base layer 
is 200kbps, while the enhancement layer bitrate is 100kbps. 
We use the following function to measure the streaming cost:  
,,C, D =
2*,%3
E*,%F2*,%3
 where jix , is the available bandwidth 
between the downstream peer i and its upstream peer j. This 
function express the ratio of the peer’s i requested bandwidth 
from the peer j, to the remained free bandwidth in the link mi,j, 
i.e. the utilization ratio of the link. Link having low utilization 
ratio, is considered as good link because it presents low delay 
and low bit error rate since the intermediate routers’ queues are 
less occupied. We note that we choose this streaming cost 
function as an example to perform our simulation. Any other 
function to evaluate the streaming cost in a link, satisfying the 
conditions of convexity and derivability mentioned in II.B, can 
be used.  
B. Results and discussions 
Due to space constraint, we present in this paragraph only 
some results that we obtained. 
Figure 2 shows the average delivery ration of the different 
layers in an overlay of 500 nodes, while varying the upload 
capacity of the peers. The common observation for the 
delivery ratio in the different layers is that it increases with the 
increase of the upload capacity of the peers. In addition we 
observe that the delivery ratio of the lower layers is always 
higher than in the higher layer. This confirms our strategy to 
allocate the lower layers first than the upper ones. That allows 
the lower layers to get the best links, and consequently high 
delivery ratio 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Delivery ratio Vs average 
available upload bandwidth  
     Figure 3: streaming cost Vs. 
network size 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Useless chunk ratio Vs 
average available upload bandwidth  
   Figure 5: streaming cost Vs. network 
configuration 
In Figure 3 we studied the average streaming cost in our 
system compared to multi-overlay auction mechanism, 
adapted to the multilayer. We perform the simulation in 
diverse topologies with different network size. In each 
network, 10% of peers belong to Q1, 30% to Q2 and 60% to 
Q3. It is observed that the average streaming cost decreases 
with the increase of the network size both in our solution as 
well as in the multi-overlay one. This can be explained by the 
increase of the number of links in the network, and 
consequently discharging the old ones. Nevertheless, in all 
configurations, the streaming cost is reduced by at least 25% 
in our solution compared to multi-overlay solution. 
In Figure 4 we compare the performance of our mechanism 
with the multi-overlay one in terms of useless chunk ratio. We 
observe that the useless chunks are relatively high in the case 
of low average upload bandwidth, mostly in the case of the 
multi-overlay solution since it does not take into consideration 
the layers importance. With the increase of the available 
upload bandwidth, the useless chunk ratio decrease, because 
of the increasing availability of the bandwidth to require the 
different layers. Our mechanism starts by allocate bandwidth 
to lower layers first, consequently these layers are received 
through the best link, which enhance the delivery ratio of 
lower layers, consequently reduce the useless chunk ratio 
comparing to the other solution.  
Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of the average streaming cost 
experienced by peers, by varying the size of each class of 
peers. The network is composed of 500 peers. 
First of all, we observe that the streaming cost in downstream 
peers of Q1 is smaller than in downstream peers of Q2 which is 
smaller than in downstream peers of Q3. This shows that the 
bandwidth allocation mechanism in our system respects the 
priorities of peers.  
     We observe also that with the increase in downstream peers 
of Q1, the average streaming cost experienced by peers of this 
class increases. This is due to the increase in the competition 
on the good quality links (links with low streaming cost). As a 
result, more and more downstream peers of Q1 get connected 
with links having higher streaming cost. On the opposite, the 
streaming cost of downstream peers with Q3 decreases with 
the increase of their number in the network. This can be 
explained by the decrease of the number of Q1 and Q2 in the 
network, consequently the competition on the best links 
reduces.  
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we propose a bandwidth allocation 
mechanism for layered streaming in P2P network that 
allocates appropriate bandwidth to the appropriate peers while 
ensuring a minimum quality level to all peers. Each upstream 
peer organizes a set of auctions to sell its bandwidth, an 
auction for each layer, starting by the lower layers. In this 
manner the lower layers are transmitted via the best links, 
consequently increasing the system throughput. 
To study the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism, we 
performed simulations and compared it with another existing 
system. We studied different metrics that are essential in 
determining the performance of our proposed mechanism. The 
results demonstrate the optimality and the effectiveness of our 
solution.  
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